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Abstract 
The idea of a novel labeling method is suggested for a new way of long-term security 
identification, inventory tracking, prevention of falsification and theft of waste casks, 
copper canisters, spent fuel containers, mercury containers, waste packages and other 
items. The suggested concept is based on the use of a unique combination of radioiso-
topes with different predictable half life. As an option for applying the radioisotope tag to 
spent fuel safeguarding it is suggested to use a mixture of α-emitting isotopes, such as 
241Am etc., with materials that easily undergo α-induced reactions with emission of spe-
cific γ-lines. Thus, the existing problem of the disposing of smoke detectors or other de-
vices [1] which contain radioisotopes can be addressed, indirectly solving an existing 
waste problem. The results of the first pilot experiments with two general designs of 
storage canisters, namely a steel container which corresponds to the one which is 
commonly used for long-term storing of mercury in Europe and USA and a copper can-
ister, the one which is in applications for nuclear repositories, are presented. As one of 
the options for a new labeling method it is proposed to use a multidimensional bar code 
symbology and tungsten plate with ultrasound techniques. It is shown that the new radi-
oisotope label offers several advantages in the scope of existing tagging techniques 
(overview is given) and can be implemented even with low activity sources. 
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Introduction 
      “…mercury, alpha waste, high level waste (HLW), etc.” – all these notions are 
related to the category of so-called long-term stored waste that are aimed at the dispo-
sition in geological repository [2]. There are number of classifications that exist for 
long-term stored waste. Generally, waste is separated into two groups: not radioactive, 
e.g. mercury waste, and radioactive that is coming from various parts of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, medical, industrial and research activities. However, there are uniting factors for 
all of them – long term management issues. One of these issues is related to sealing and 
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containment verification technologies that can meet all needs for maintaining continuity 
of knowledge of waste in containers [3].  
     Various countries address this in different ways. For example, in US 10 CFR 
60.135 regulations for HLW package design a unique identification is considered as one 
of the specific acceptance criteria:  
“…(4) Unique identification. A label or other means of identification shall be 
provided for each waste package. The identification shall not impair the in-
tegrity of the waste package and shall be applied in such a way that the in-
formation shall be legible at least to the end of the period of retrievability. 
Each waste package identification shall be consistent with the waste pack-
age's permanent written records” [4]. 
     Similar criteria, i.e. “Qualitative acceptance criteria for radioactive wastes to be 
disposed of in deep geological formations” are discussed in Nirex Report (United King-
dom, UK): 
“…Unique identification. Criteria. Each waste package for emplacement in a 
repository should be marked with a unique identification. Additional criteria. 
Records should be kept at different locations, nationally and internationally. 
Records should include information on location, chemical and physical 
properties of the waste; repository design and the information used for final 
safety assessment’ [5]. 
      Thus, there is a noticeable trend towards the implementation of a unique labeling 
of spent fuel waste canisters which are aimed at the emplacement in a repository.  
 
Setting up requirements to the ideal tagging system 
      While choosing a particular type of tag it is necessary to consider a number of 
important parameters. There were a few attempts to systematize criteria for the selection 
of a specific tag, for example, based on: purpose of tag, type of the container, robust-
ness, reliability, ease of application, effectiveness, interface with other safeguards and 
security elements, cost etc. [6].  
      Although, in connection with a long-term (hundreds of years) stored item, such as 
nuclear waste, spent fuel or mercury containers, one can consolidate these require-
ments in five main points ("intuitive requirements"), i.e. the ideal tag must provide: 
1. Environmental safety (avoid corrosion effects of e.g. copper canisters). The la-
beling system should avoid corrosion effects of canisters which can be induced in 
the long-term run, thus for instance avoiding leakage of spent fuel waste com-
ponents later on. 
2. Non-contact reader system (preferably). 
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3. Long operation time. The labeling system should have an operating time at least 
from ten to a few hundred years. 
4. Large and unique tag memory. The labeling system should enable fully unique 
identification of the canister content in a manner consistent with permanent rec-
ords of the storage or repository. 
5. Security technique against falsification of data, errors/multiple verification. The 
labeling system should have high level of security, i.e. low risk of falsification or 
error.  
      Thus, an ideal identification tag meets all the challenges of the international initi-
ative on a holistic Safety, Security and Safeguards ('3S') concept. Therefore, hereafter 
we will consider the suitability of the currently existing technologies and new approach to 
these "intuitive requirements". 
 
Overview of existing methods 
      The conventional tagging techniques include etching characters, affixing identifi-
cation plates, welding, etc. However, when considering an application for long-term 
storage of waste canisters they have a number of gaps in the factors of environmental 
safety, security and long operation time. Other disadvantages of the traditional labeling 
technology are de-
scribed in [7]. Modern 
labeling techniques 
(Figure 1) may partly 
solve these problems 
and be useful for 
meeting the goals of a 
unique labeling system 
compatible with the 
record keeping of the 
storage or repository. 
Among the modern 
labeling techniques are 
radio frequency tagging systems, electronic tags, ultrasonic systems [8] and RPT (Re-
flective Particle Tags) [9],  SANAs (SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates; SERS: 
Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering) [10], etc.  
The main disadvantages of these techniques are analyzed in [11].   Hereafter we only 
give a short overview of them in the light of the previously defined "intuitive require-
ments". 
      Radio frequency systems (RF) consist of a memory chip, an antenna, and a 
Figure 1. Existing tagging 
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transmitter/receiver system and therefore 
overcome problems related to printing or 
etching characters on the side of the contain-
er. RF devices can be active, passive and 
semi-passive, as shown in Figure 2. Active 
tags contain a small internal power source to 
communicate, store and process large 
amounts of information in the chip. A power 
source is usually a lithium battery lasting less 
than 5 years. This makes them unsuitable for 
use in long-term storages. Passive tags have 
no battery. In order to provide power and data 
to the chip, they use the current in the loop 
antenna which is induced by the interrogating 
RF signal. Thus, they receive power from the reader's antenna. The main problems en-
countered with both active and passive RF devices is related to interference of the met-
allization layer with the RF signal, locating methods and low transmission range. 
      Ultrasonic tagging is based on the assumption of the uniqueness of the welding 
area of the cask. Thus, it assumes that in the process of ultrasonic scanning one can 
obtain a unique fingerprint for each stored container. However, it is difficult to explicitly 
evaluate performance of UIT in terms of environmental safety, long operating time and 
security. According to results of tests performed in [12] UIT methods suffer from prob-
lems with unknown long-term signature stability and material sensitivity, problems with 
repeatability of the signature and influence by the human factor.  
      Reflective Particle Tags (RPT) have been proposed by Sandia National Labora-
tories (SNL) in 1992. The tag represents the transparent adhesive matrix with encapsu-
lated reflective particles. Although this system would be good enough to provide the 
identification for non-nuclear long-stored waste it will be difficult to apply it to casks 
containing radioactive material due to the difficulties connected to the reader system (a 
number of lights which induce the reflection in the tag) and presence of gamma back-
ground outside the cask walls. The characteristics of the reflective particle tag regarding 
long operating times, a large and unique tag memory and security can not be evaluated 
explicitly due to the present research stage of the technology. Results of tests performed 
in [12] indicate that the main drawbacks of RPT are related to the image degradation, 
inconsistent calibrations, occasional reader head instability and false rejection rate 
caused by corrosion.  SANAs technology has unique strengths suited to a number of 
applications. However, due to the similar nature to RPT, it can suffer from the same 
problems as RPT techniques. 
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      Accordingly there is a recognized need for a labeling system which last at least 
from ten to a few hundred years (time factor), at the same time enabling fully unique 
identification of the canister contents in a manner consistent with permanent records of 
the storage or repository (information factor), have a high level of security, i.e. low risk of 
falsification or error (security factor), and give the possibility to avoid a corrosion effect of 
canisters induced by the traditional tagging methods (environmental factor). 
 
 
Proposed approach and its application to the nuclear waste contain-
ers 
      The main idea of the proposed method consists of using a unique combination of 
radioisotopes with different predictable length of life and a long operating time, wherein 
the unique combination of radioisotopes comprises the mixture of two or more radioiso-
topes [13]. Radioisotopes have unique inherent properties, such as long half-life (hun-
dreds of years), different penetration properties and energy characteristics (lines in the 
spectrum emitted by radioisotopes). These properties make them extremely attractive for 
use in tagging of long-term stored items, since they automatically provide: environmental 
safety (radioisotopic tag can be placed inside the canister), non-contact reader system, 
long operating time. The combination of radioisotopes should be chosen independently 
for each cask/waste container. 
      The majority of the background gamma rays in spent fuel originates from activa-
tion and fission products, e.g. 137Cs (662 keV (0.9) γ-line), 134Cs (569 keV (0.15), 605 
keV (0.98), 796 keV (0.85), 802 keV (0.09), 1039 keV (0.01), 1168 keV (0.02) and 1365 
keV (0.03) γ-lines), 144Pr (697 keV (0.0148), 1489 keV (0.003) and 2185 keV (0.008) 
γ-lines), 154Eu (723 keV (0.19), 873 keV (0.12), 996 keV (0.1), 1005 keV (0.17), 1275 
keV (0.36) and 1595 keV (0.03)  
γ-lines) and 106Ru (512 keV (0.21), 
622 keV (0.1), 1051 keV (0.02), 
1128 keV (0.004) and 1357 keV 
(0.006) γ-lines). For a fuel cooled 
for a short period of time (less than 
four years), the high energy gam-
ma lines, e.g. a 2185 keV gamma 
line from 144Pr, will be possible to 
measure. However, when the fuel 
will be sent to an encapsulation 
plant after a number of years of 
cooling, 137mBa, the daughter nuclide of 137Cs, will be the main gamma emitter. Thus, if 
Figure 3. Tag (versions 1 and 2). 
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the radioisotope tag will have high energy signatures, there will be no problem with ra-
diation background coming from the fuel.  
      The simplest version of the conventional radioisotope tag may just include the 
specific radioisotopes which emits γ-rays with 
energies higher than 1 MeV. Although, access to these isotopes can be restricted or their 
cost might be rather high. Therefore, we suggest to use the following version of the ra-
dioisotope tag based on α-emitting isotopes such as 241Am, for example, in a mixture 
with one of the materials described in [14], as shown in Figure 3. This version of the tag 
will serve the needs of long-term tagging of nuclear waste, as well as it can solve the 
existing problem of disposing of smoke detectors or other devices (surge voltage pro-
tection devices, electronic valves etc. [1]) which nowadays contain radioisotopes such as 
241Am. It should be mentioned that according to the Report of the EU commission [1], as 
of the balance sheet date of year 2001, Ireland manufactured two million ionization 
chamber smoke detectors per year (activity of each detector is 33.3 - 37 kBq), while for 
example Sweden imported 700 000 of them. Thus, the price of the radioisotope tag 
based on this type of waste will be partly covered by the costs of the waste disposing. At 
the same time this method will open the possibility of recycling nuclear waste of this type. 
      One of the attractive options for realization of the radioisotope tag is implementa-
tion of the 
multidimen-
sional bar 
code sym-
bology, for 
example in 
a way as 
shown in 
Figures 3-4. 
This version of the tag is suitable for a situation where the information about the item is 
not known in advance and should be encoded in the unique radioisotope tag directly at 
the encapsulation plant. This realization of the tag includes two components: a radioi-
sotope plate prepared by authorities at a facility licensed for this work and a foil which is 
printed at the encapsulation plant. This concept is appealing in that while printing the tag 
a specific color could be used. As an example, the base of the tag can be made of an 
241Am α-emitting isotope. Afterwards, the foil which contains the bar code could be 
printed with colors based on 9Be, 23Na, 19F, 10;11B, 30P, 7;6Li etc. materials. The printed foil 
must be placed in close contact with the α-emitting base of the tag. These materials have 
a high cross-section for α-induced reactions, such as (α,n), (α,p) etc. Thus, the bar code 
might be read detecting α-induced gamma rays. The energy of the gamma rays depends 
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on the material which is chosen for printing the tag.  
 
Conclusions 
We have described a new concept of a long-term security identification tags/labels which 
is based on the use of unique combinations of radioisotopes. In the case of application of 
this concept to spent fuel safeguarding it is suggested to use a mixture of α-emitting 
isotopes, such as 241Am with materials that easily undergo α-induced reactions with 
emission of specific γ-lines. Thus, if the radioisotope tag will have a high energy signa-
ture, there will be no problem with radiation background coming from the fuel. Moreover, 
this version of the radioisotope tag allows to solve the existing problem of the disposing 
of smoke detectors or other devices [1] which contain radioisotopes, such as 241Am, thus, 
indirectly providing a recycling of nuclear waste. As an economical advantage, it should 
be mentioned that the price of the radioisotope tag based on this type of waste will be 
partly covered by the costs of the waste disposing. As an attractive option for a new la-
beling method we proposed the possibility to realize a multidimensional bar code sym-
bology. The new radioisotope label offers several advantages, as compared to the cur-
rently used tagging methods. It provides environmental safety, non-contact reader sys-
tem, long operating time, large and unique tag memory, security technique against falsi-
fication of data, errors/multiple verification, recycling option for ionization chamber 
smoke detectors and other devices. Further details can be found in [14]. 
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